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Nanotech Scenario Series
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Current Results of Our Research
These pages, marked with
GREEN headings, are published for
comment and criticism. These
are not our final findings; some of these opinions will probably change.
LOG OF UPDATES
CRN Research: Overview of Current Findings
Thirty Essential Nanotechnology Studies - #22
Overview of all studies: Because of the largely
unexpected transformational power of molecular manufacturing, it is urgent to
understand the issues raised. To date, there has not been anything approaching
an adequate study of these issues. CRN's recommended series of
thirty essential studies
is organized into five sections, covering fundamental theory, possible
technological capabilities, bootstrapping potential, product capabilities, and
policy questions. Several preliminary conclusions are stated, and because our
understanding points to a crisis, a parallel process of conducting the studies
is urged.
CRN is actively looking for researchers interested in
performing or assisting with this work. Please contact CRN Research Director
Chris Phoenix if you would like more information or if you have comments on
the proposed studies.
| Study #22 |
How
can proliferation and use of nanofactories and their products be limited? |
| |
This study will
explore the challenge of preventing black markets, independent development,
etc. |
| Subquestion |
How easy will it
be to detect a development program? |
| Preliminary answer |
Probably quite
difficult. Development does not require exotic materials or massive
industrial activity. It may require mainly off-the-shelf technology.
Researchers will be from diverse and common fields like software engineering
and computational chemistry, not concentrated in one exotic field. Depending
on the bootstrapping 'recipe', the design effort might be dispersed
(networked/teleconferenced), and the entire physical operation might be
carried out in one moderate-sized laboratory. And most of the research would
not require world-class talent, though a successful program today might well
require world-class leadership. |
| Subquestion |
How much easier
will it be to develop a second nanofactory, compared with developing the
first one? |
| Preliminary answer |
Reverse
engineering will give hints as to which path to take. The definite knowledge
that it can be done at all will reduce institutional friction. General
technology advances will give a second program more to work with. Any leaks
of know-how or software will further reduce the difficulty. It seems likely
that the second nanofactory will be an order of magnitude less costly. |
| Subquestion |
How can nanoscale
products be detected? |
| Preliminary answer |
Unknown.
Nanoporous filters can trap them. Non-proximal sub-wavelength optics, if
they work as claimed, may be able to scan for them at a distance—but there
are lots of natural nanoparticles, so recognition is also a problem. MRI may
be able to detect at a distance, though resolution is a problem and there
may be a theoretical limit. |
| Subquestion |
How easy will it
be to smuggle nanofactories? |
| Preliminary answer |
A fully
functional nanofactory, able (given a supply of feedstock, energy, and
blueprint software) to make one twice as big (and so on) and thus recreate a
full manufacturing capacity, could be just a few microns on a side—small
enough to hide inside a human cell. Or any convenient size in between. We
don't know of any way to detect something like that without total intrusion
of the volume being searched, which probably implies destruction. |
| Subquestion |
How easy will it
be to detect proliferation-related activity? |
| Preliminary answer |
Quite difficult.
Especially once the 'recipe' is known, it will be very hard to spot a
project—R&D for a nanofactory project may require only a single small lab
and a few computers. (For comparison, consider
Zyvex.) |
| Subquestion |
How effective
will deterrence be? |
| Preliminary answer |
To someone
lacking a comparable capability, a nanofactory would be incredibly valuable.
This implies that deterrence will not be successful. |
| Conclusion |
It will be very difficult to limit proliferation of nanofactory
technology and possession of bootleg nanofactories.
|
| Other studies |
1.
Is
mechanically guided chemistry a viable basis for a manufacturing technology?
2. To what extent is molecular manufacturing counterintuitive and
underappreciated in a way that causes underestimation of its importance?
3. What is
the performance and potential of diamondoid machine-phase chemical
manufacturing and products?
4. What is the performance and potential of biological programmable
manufacturing and products?
5. What is the performance and potential of nucleic acid
manufacturing and products?
6. What other chemistries and options should be studied?
7. What
applicable sensing, manipulation, and fabrication tools exist?
8. What will be required to develop diamondoid machine-phase chemical
manufacturing and products?
9. What will be required to develop biological programmable
manufacturing and products?
10. What will be required to develop nucleic acid manufacturing and
products?
11. How rapidly will the cost of development decrease?
12. How could an effective development program be structured?
13. What is
the probable capability of the manufacturing system?
14. How capable will the products be?
15. What will the products cost?
16. How rapidly could products be designed?
17. Which
of today's products will the system make more accessible or cheaper?
18. What new products will the system make accessible?
19. What impact will the system have on production and distribution?
20. What effect will molecular manufacturing have on military and
government capability and planning, considering the implications of arms
races and unbalanced development?
21. What effect will this have on macro- and microeconomics?
23. What effect will this have on policing?
24. What beneficial or desirable effects could this have?
25. What effect could this have on civil rights and liberties?
26. What are the disaster/disruption scenarios?
27. What effect could this have on geopolitics?
28. What policies toward development of molecular manufacturing does
all this suggest?
29. What policies toward administration of
molecular manufacturing does all this suggest?
|
| Studies should begin
immediately. |
The situation is
extremely urgent. The stakes are unprecedented, and the world is unprepared.
The basic findings of these studies should be verified as rapidly as
possible (months, not years). Policy preparation and planning for
implementation, likely including a crash development program, should begin
immediately. |
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