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Nanotech Scenario Series
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Results of Our Ongoing Research
These pages, marked with
GREEN headings, are published for
comment and criticism. These
are not our final findings; some of these opinions will probably change.
LOG OF UPDATES
CRN Research: Overview of Current Findings
No Simple Solutions for Nanotechnology
Risks
Overview:
Molecular manufacturing creates several severe risks, and each risk tempts a simple
and extreme solution. However, a
patchwork of
extreme solutions will be both destructive and ineffective. For example,
Bill Joy and others have proposed halting nanotechnology research entirely.
This would not actually work; instead, it would relocate the research to less
responsible venues. The risks might be delayed by a few years, but would be far
worse when they appeared because the technology would be even less controllable.
To take another example, economic upheaval might be prevented by strict
commercial licensing of all uses of the technology. This has two problems.
First, digital protection schemes for commercial products have often proved
quite easy to crack. Second, if the technology is so restricted that it cannot
disrupt existing economic systems, continuing poverty will kill millions of
people each year, fueling backlash, social unrest, espionage, and independent
development. Each risk must be reduced by some means that does not exacerbate
others. This will not be easy, and will require creative and sensitive
solutions.
| MM risks may include
opposite extremes; so may attempted solutions. |
Molecular manufacturing (MM) creates several severe
risks, of several different types. For example, risks may be political,
economic, or personal. Even within a single category, opposite situations
may create risks. If incredibly cheap manufacturing drives down prices,
economies may be disrupted. But if prices were held artificially high, the
result would be concerted attempts to circumvent the restrictions—as well
as widespread denial of humanitarian relief. With product cost potentially
orders of magnitude lower than product value, prices may be unstable—they
may fluctuate wildly as businesses abandon product lines and monopolies
form, increase prices by ten times or more, and disappear under new
competition. Or anticompetitive behavior may emerge; this seems quite
likely under the circumstances, but this outcome would remove the benefits
of free markets. In another category, allowing completely unrestricted use
of MNT by everyone would provide powerful tools to criminals and terrorists;
however, restricting MNT completely would require extremely harsh measures,
constituting a risk in themselves. |
| Fighting one risk can
increase another. |
The problem gets worse when several risks are considered
together. Attempts to prevent one risk, such as criminal use of nano-built
products, may only increase another risk (maybe even in a different
category), such as creation of a black market in unregulated MM. In
addition, although many of the risks involve deliberate misuse of the
technology, some occur even when all individual actors are behaving
appropriately; such risks cannot be reduced by any simple strategy. CRN is
focusing on the most dangerous risks—about a dozen of them, each of which
needs its own handling, and all of which interact. Any MM administration
program must work simultaneously to increase national security, increase
economic security, and fulfill many other positive goals, while at the same
time applying the necessary restrictions and policies to avoid instability
in several different domains. |
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For initial study, the risks will be divided into two
broad categories: those that result from too much MM or too little
regulation (the "permissive risks"), and those that result from too little
MM or too much regulation (the "restrictive risks"). In general, attempts
to avoid a permissive risk by increasing regulation will increase one or
more of the restrictive risks, and vice versa. Any MM policy must also
interact with the actions of users and developers/providers, both legitimate
and illicit. Planning of a nanotechnology administration program must
consider real-world motivations and situations, as well as multiple stages
of cause and effect. |
| Nanotech must be restricted
somewhat. |
We can't afford to have unrestricted molecular
manufacturing widely available to individuals. Criminals and terrorists
would invent new products faster than society could compensate. Hobbyists
would invent grey goo for the fun of it, just as computer viruses and worms
are developed and spread today. Availability to individuals implies
availability to governments, which implies arms races and various covert and
nasty uses. Widespread individual use of molecular manufacturing systems
would create at least as many problems as widespread use of personal
computers: intellectual property violations, security problems... except
that many of these problems would be translated into the physical world,
where they could do far more damage. Even if MM is initially limited to
governments and maybe a few corporations, it could create economic and
political nightmares. Arms races and economic disruption would be quite
likely. And as we will see, such limitation would increase the occurrence
of restrictive risks. |
| Restrictions can be bypassed. |
The initial developers of MM would surely want to keep
control of it. How, then, could the technology become unrestricted? There
are two pathways that must be dealt with separately. First, the technology
can be stolen, cracked, "liberated," or otherwise accessed illicitly. Second, the existence of independent
MM development programs greatly increases the
chance of unfortunate use, and also provides more opportunities for
technology theft. Two countries with independent MM capabilities could
begin an arms race. Two companies with molecular manufacturing capability
could begin a price war, resulting in either extremely low profits or
extremely unstable prices. At least two of the risks, environmental damage
from profligate MM use and social damage from undesired products, can occur
even in the presence of some limitations on the technology. These risks can
be prevented by severely restricting civilian use. However, as we will see,
such restriction will probably be impossible. |
| Motivation for bypassing
restrictions must be reduced. |
There are several motivations that can lead either to
independent development or to technology theft. From any nation's point of
view, foreign attempts to develop MM may be perceived (with justification)
as threats to the global balance of military or economic power. This will
probably spark several crash MM programs. Once the technology is developed,
any group without access to it will have a strong motivation to gain that
access. National pride, intellectual curiosity, and simple rebellion can
motivate attempts to own, develop, or control the technology for its own
sake, or "crack" restrictions on it. If the use of the technology is costly
due to licensing, financial interests may fuel attempts to acquire MM capability. If a disadvantaged group is unable to access
it due to any form of restrictions—especially if the group is impoverished
and MM could literally save lives—there will be a strong humanitarian and
idealistic drive to make the technology available to them by licit or
illicit means. |
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These diverse and strong motivations, and the severe
risks they lead to, invite a strong restrictive response. However,
anti-nanotechnology regulation may be counterproductive. For example, any
regulation that reduces humanitarian use of the technology will increase the
idealistic motive. Any regulation that imposes severe penalties will
increase curiosity and rebellion, while providing at best a partial
deterrent. (Even the death penalty is insufficient to prevent some
premeditated crimes.) Secrecy will likewise increase curiosity, and spark
independent research. Any regulation that increases cost will increase the
economic motive. It seems likely that a policy based entirely on
restrictive regulation cannot long succeed. Many of the motivations can be
blunted by making molecular manufacturing technology widely available under
some more delicate form of control. Although this must be done with extreme
care, it appears to be a necessary part of successful MNT administration. |
| Restrictions may themselves
be risky. |
As implied above, the dangers of unrestricted molecular
manufacturing may inspire forceful and extreme restrictions, or even
forceful preemptive actions to prevent MM proliferation. Extreme responses
pose their own dangers. If carried to its logical conclusion, a policy of
preventing any possible independent development would require worldwide
restriction of technology to a pre-2000 level—perhaps even a pre-1950
level. Intensive surveillance might also be used to prevent any
development, but the required degree of privacy intrusion (at least in the
absence of near-AI levels of image processing) would be a clear violation of
human rights. Thus the possible responses to MM
risks create additional
risks. Even in less extreme cases, attempts to preserve existing political
or economic systems unchanged may cause the benefits of MM to be denied to
those who need them most. Any MM-related disaster could increase the
pressure for extreme restrictions. A technology leak, even without a
disaster, could require (or at least inspire) very oppressive restrictions
to avoid problems. |
|
Restrictions may lead to a
vicious cycle. |
It is possible that a vicious cycle could develop between
oppressive restrictions and attempts to break those restrictions. Criminals
and terrorists are a small fraction of humanity with limited resources. But
if MM technology is restricted enough to create prices that are obviously
highly inflated, mainstream consumers will embrace any means to circumvent
the restrictions (as they already do for entertainment). If the technology
is restricted to the point that people are dying for lack of it—which is
quite possible, given the number of potential lifesaving spinoffs—then even
governments, humanitarians, and some of the technology controllers will have
strong motivation to break the restrictions. Such widespread pressure to
bypass the restrictions could inspire even tougher restrictions, costing
more human lives and suffering. The likeliest outcomes are either
widespread, long-term oppression, or an uncontrolled release of the
technology. |
| Blanket restrictions won't
work, but careful policy can. |
The idea that control can best be maintained by giving up
some control is counterintuitive at first, but it's simply a case of the
well-known principle of diminishing returns. Any parent knows what happens
if they try to micro-manage a teenager, and economists have long been aware
that raising tax rates too high will result in lower total tax revenue. There is not enough space in a single article to analyze all the
interactions of all the solutions to all the risks, but the examples given
here are sufficient to show that in many cases, extreme solutions will
backfire. Even if policy makers were willing to accept the humanitarian and
economic losses of overly restrictive MM policy, such policy would be self
defeating. However, this argument cannot justify a complete lack of
restriction; the risks introduced by such a policy appear insupportable, and
dealing with the problems would create harsher restrictions in the long
run. Instead, policy must be sensitive to a wide variety of factors,
including political, economic, and social dynamics. |
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It should be emphasized that, although this page seems
pessimistic, the larger picture is not so bleak. The very factors that make
molecular manufacturing so dangerous—the rapid prototyping and unlimited
manufacturing, and the immense complexity and power of the products—also
provide unprecedented opportunities for positive outcomes. Even a small
fraction of the raw capability would be sufficient to satisfy the world's
humanitarian needs for generations to come. Another fraction could multiply
the economy and enrich every owner of the technology. And only a small
fraction of MM products are unacceptably dangerous. What is required is
not blanket permissiveness or blanket restriction, but careful
administration of each separate risk and benefit. It will take time to
design and implement such administration, and it will be important in the
nearer term to prepare for responsible administration by implementing
responsible development. |
DEVIL'S ADVOCATE —
Submit your criticism, please!
You're expecting policy makers to be rational?
No—we're desperately hoping that they will be rational. Or
at least self-interested, and willing to study the tradeoffs. Molecular
manufacturing technology creates a large carrot and a large stick. CRN hopes to show the
issues clearly enough to make it possible to avoid the wrong choices.
Next Page:
Administration Options
Previous Page: Dangers of
Molecular Manufacturing
Title Page:
Overview of Current Findings
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